International contributors in economics, business, and law examine rent seeking, defined here as the use of resources unproductively to claim output or wealth that already exists or to seek
policies that create privileged benefits. Although Part 2 requires some familiarity with techniques used in economic modeling, most of the book is written to be accessible to students,
researchers, and policy practitioners. The first part of the book contains two chapters on the nature of rent seeking and rent seeking as political economy. Part 2 on theory covers contest
models. Topics include asymmetries in rent seeking, prize-sharing rules on collective rent seeking, and sabotage in contests. Part 3 describes applications of theory and outcomes, discussing
topics such as regulatory rent seeking, international trade policy, rent seeking through public finance, and litigation as rent seeking. Part 4 offers case studies of different societies around
the world, in both developed and developing countries. Part 5 describes the relationship between rent seeking and institutions, placing rent seeking in the context of constitutional political
economy. Annotation ©2015 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)
